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present article will follow in a later number of the LAW
REVIEW.
WILLIAM G. HALE, whose article on THE MISSOURI LAW
RELATIVE TO THE USE OF TESTIMONY GIVEN AT A FORmER
TRIAL is the first of a series on the Missouri law of evidence, is
Dean of the Washington University School of Law.
McCUNE GILL, who asks and answers the question, WHAT IS
TITLE? is an alumnus of the School of Law and the author of
several books and articles on the real property law of Mis-
souri. At present he is vice-president of the Title Insurance
Corporation of St. Louis.
AN INDORSEE FOR COLLECTION AS TRUSTEE FOR
THE PROCEEDS IN MISSOURI
The Oran bank, in the case of Federal Reserve Bank v. Mill-
spaugh,1 agreed with the Federal Reserve bank to remit in cash
or acceptable exchange for all paper drawn on it and sent for
"collection and remittance" by the Federal Reserve bank. Such
remittance was to be made on the day that the Oran bank re-
ceived the paper for collection. The Federal Reserve bank pur-
suant to the agreement sent items drawn on the Oran bank and
indorsed "for collection and remittance" to the latter bank. Col-
1 (1926), 314 Mo., 282 S. W. 706 the court in its opinion declared: "Here,
as there, the facts disclose that no reciprocal accounts were kept between
these banks, the respondent and appellant. When the relation existing be-
tween the banks, as in the case at bar, is that of principal and agent, the
funds collected by the collecting bank become impressed with a trust in
favor of the owner of the item collected. This is true although the item
collected be one drawn on the collecting bank and is collected by charging
the item against the drawee's account, or if it be an item payable at the
collecting bank and is collected by a check drawn on it. The trust in either
case follows the funds into the hands of the receiver-in this instance the
financial commissioner-although the collecting bank may fail before remit-
ting the proceeds collected providing these items exist: (1) That the item
was forwarded for collection and remittance of the proceeds. (2) That the
drawer of the check had a sufficient balance with collecting bank to author-
ize the charging of the item to his account. (3) That at the time the charge
was made the collecting bank had sufficient funds available to honor the
check. (4) That the bank which failed had sufficient funds on hands to
pay the amount it had collected. Further than this the creation of the re-
lation of principal and agent under the original agreement by the terms of
which the proceeds of the funds collected were to be forwarded to the prin-
cipal in currency or acceptable exchange did not change the relation to that
of debtor and creditor by reason of an attempted remittance in uncollectible
paper."
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lection was made by a charge against the makers' accounts in the
Oran bank, whose failure preceded the payment of a draft upon
a third bank in favor of the plaintiff for such collection. Plain-
tiff was permitted a preference in the assets of the insolvent
bank. "Where a note, a check or a draft is forwarded by one
bank to another, bearing a restrictive indorsement 'for collection
and remittance' under directions to collect and forward the pro-
ceeds to the sender, the relationship of principal and agent is
created and not that of debtor and creditor. The funds thus
collected are held to constitute a trust fund and entitled to a
preference over the claims of general creditors." That the Mis-
souri court, by the adoption of this view took a position far in
advance of the English and most American courts was evident
even to itself.2
The majority view has for its foundation the custom of banks
to mingle the proceeds of collection items with general assets
and to make an immediate debit entry upon their books, thereby
rendering the specific res indistinguishable and creating the re-
lation of debtor and creditor.2 Knowledge of such a custom is
presumed in the indorser, from which his intention to be regard-
ed upon collection as a creditor is inferred.4 The soundness of
this view must rest upon an actual existence of such a custom,
and the validity of the inferrential intent of the indorser to be
regarded as a creditor. If by crediting the indorser is meant
the completion of an entry in any record book of the bank, the
courts have been justified in stating the existence of such a cus-
tom. But if such be the meaning, the custom can hardly be said,
' First National Bank of Lapeer v. Sanford (1895), 62 Mo. A. 394.
"We concede that this reasoning proceeds on advanced lines, and is seem-
ingly opposed to the weight of authority in the other states." In comment-
ing upon the decisions in Harrison v. Smith (1884), 83 Mo. 210 and Stoller
v. Coates (1885), 88 Mo. 514 the court in Midland National Bank v. Bright-
well (1899), 148 Mo. 358, 49 S. W. 994 says: "In going to this length un-
questionably this court took a position in advance of the English chancery
and most of the states of this Union, but with the soundness of this propo-
sition we are satisfied."
'Bank v. Bradley (1926), 136 S. C. 511, 134 S. E. 510; California Pack-
ing Co. v. McClintock (1925), 75 Mont. 72, 241 P. 1077; National Bank v.
Glanton (1917), 146 Ga. 786, 92 S. E. 336; Leach v. Iowa State Saving
Bank (Ia., 1926), 211 N. W. 517; Lippit v. Thames Loan & Trust Co. (1914),
88 Conn. 185, 90 A. 369; Hecker Milling Co. v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co. (1922),
242 Mass. 181, 136 N. E. 333; Central Trust Co. v. Hanover Trust Co.
(1922), 242 Mass. 265, 136 N. E. 336; Gonyer v. Williams (1914), 168
Calif. 452, 143 P. 736; First Nat'l Bank of Ventura v. Williams (1926), 15
Fed. (2d) 585; Smith & Co. v. Montgomery (1923), 209 Ala. 100, 95 So.
290; Commonwealth v. Tradesmen's Trust Co. (1915), 250 Pa. 378, 95 A.
577; Commercial Bank v. Armstrong (1892), 148 U. S. 50.
'See note 3, supra.
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in every case, to designate the relationship contended for by the
majority view. Bookkeeping is necessary, and to argue that a
debit or credit entry in any record kept in indicative of an inten-
tion to be a debtor or creditor, and in fact does create such a
relationship, is to advance a fallacy. It is submitted that many
banks handle collection items through separate and distinct col-
lection and transit departments which maintain their own rec-
ords.5 This system does not indicate a mingling of the proceeds
with the general assets. The Federal Reserve banks maintain
such separate departments and records and regard themselves
as agents.6 Moreover an indorsement "for collection and remit-
tance" evidences a contrary intention. As between the two in-
dices, the courts have not only pressed as inference from custom
too far, but have utterly disregarded the expressed intention of
the indorser. A restrictive indorsement contemplates retention
of control of negotiable paper and assumes to create a fiduciary
relationship as to the proceeds.7 It appears that the courts have
taken, in the face of an expressed communicative intent, a cus-
tom of doubtful existence, of which the parties are presumed to
have knowledge, as the sole and unequivocal criterion of the in-
tention of the parties. This criticism does not extend to the
courts which, regardless of the restrictive indorsement, find the
intention of the parties from a course of business between them,
and thus deny a preference. 8 The fact that banks exact a charge
for such service is not consistent with the debtor and creditor
relationship. 9
Some courts, especially those of the Federal government, re-
fuse a preference where collection has been made by check upon
the collecting bank or by charging the accounts of the drawees. 0
'ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING AND FINANCE, p. 131 "Where the volume of
out of town checks is large a separate department known as collection and
transit department is created."
'Federal Reserve Board Regulation (1924) series, Regulation J., sec. V,
par. 1. "A Federal Reserve bank will act only as agent of the bank from
which it receives such checks and will assume no liability except for its own
negligence and its guaranty of prior indorsements."
' Norton, BILLS & NOTES, pp. 168-172.
'Midland Nat'l Bank v. Brightwell (1899), 148 Mo. 359, 49 S. W. 994;
American Bank of DeSoto v. People's Bank of DeSoto (Mo., 1923), 255
S. W. 943. For explanation of reciprocal accounts arrangement see Fed-
eral Reserve Bank v. Peters (1924), 139 Va. 45, 123 S. E. 379.
'Encyclopedia of Banking and Finance at p. 31. Collection charges are:
"Charges by a bank for the collection of checks, coupons, drafts, notes and
acceptances, drawn upon banks, corporations or individuals at points out-
side the city in which the sending bank is located."
"Rorebeck v. Benedict Flour & Seed Co. (1928), 26 Fed. (2d) 440; Dick-
son v. First Nat'l Bank (1928), 26 Fed. (2d) 411; Larabee Flour Mills v.
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It is argued that before such a preference can be allowed it must
be shown that the assets which come into the hands of the trus-
tee in bankruptcy be actually increased.1' It is no doubt true
that a cestui que trust is entitled to the satisfaction of his claim
if he can show that the trust fund or property into which it is
converted came into the hands of the trustee in bankruptcy and
increased the assets of the estate, even though the property is
incapable of identification. 12 While the Federal courts are cor-
rect in their reliance upon this theory, they are hardly justified
in indicating that an augmentation can occur only through a cash
collection. It would apparently satisfy these courts if the drawee
of the draft to be collected, wrote a check against his account in
the collecting bank, received the money and then handed it back
with instructions to pay the draft.'3 The absurdity of this is ap-
parent. Furthermore it is difficult to see how the method of pay-
mqnt by a third party can prejudice the rights of the restrictive
indorser as they previously existed. To insist upon such a rule
is to press to extreme the requirement of an actual physical res.
Banks and business concerns handle as little actual currency
as possible. They have resorted to negotiable paper as a sub-
stitute and as a means of expediting business transactions.14
Very seldom will the collection be made in cash. To require col-
lection to be made in currency is to deter immediate collection
and to impede the speedy consummation of business through the
use of negotiable paper. Courts which require no actual cash
collection reason that when there is a sufficiency in the accounts
to be charged and in the vaults of the bank, it is in duty bound
to appropriate the cash and to remit it to the endorser, and when
it fails in this, it follows that by retaining the cash its assets are
augmented.5 This view is in line with the argument of the Mis-
First Nat'l Bank of Henryetta (1926), 13 Fed. (2d) 330; American Can Co.
v. Williams (1910), 178 Fed. 420; Mechanics & Metal Nat'l Bank v. Buch-
ana (1926), 12 Fed. (2d) 891; Nyassa Dist. v. Bank (1921), 3 Fed. (2d)
648; Empire State Surety Co. v. Carroll County (1912), 194 Fed. 593;
Freiberg v. Stoddard (1894), 161 Pa. 259; Peters Shoe Co. v. Murray
(1903), 31 Texas Civ. App. 259, 71 S. W. 977.
' Larabee Flour Mills v. First Nat'l Bank of Henryetta (1926), 12 Fed.
(2d) 133. See also cases supra note 10.
Bogert, TRUSTS (1921), pp. 531-536.
' Darragh Co. v. Goodman (1916), 124 Ark. 532, 187 S. W. 673. "Cer-
tainly there is no necessity for the drawee of the draft to take its check to
its bank, the collector, and present it and receive the money, and hand it
back in payment of the draft."
" Wright, READINGS IN MONEY, CREDIT, AND BANKING PRINCIPLES (1926),
p. 377. "It has frequently been estimated that from 90 to 95 per cent of all
payments of money in the United States are made by checks drawn upon
banks."
" Hawaiian Pineapple Co. v. Brown (1923), 69 Mont. 140, 220 P. 1114.
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souri courts which have gone to the extreme of declaring such
a retention and mingling of the funds a wrofgful conversion."'
The Missouri doctrine rests upon the decisions of two cases,
Harrison v. Smith17 and Stoller v. Coates.8 Both cases present
facts not entirely similar to those of Federal Reserve Bank v.
Millspaugh."9 Neither involves paper sent for "collection and
remittance," but rather a deposit of money in the form of a
check in favor of the insolvent bank for a specific use which was
never accomplished. In the Harrison case a series of communi-
cations resulted in the plaintiff sending a check payable to the
bank to be used as a loan on a deed of trust. The bank, instead
of indorsing the check to the borrower, sent it for collection to
the bank on which it was drawn, receiving credit therefor, and
in fact never executed the loan, although representations to the
contrary were made by it before becoming insolvent. In the
Stoller case a sum of money was deposited in the bank by means
of a draft payable to the plaintiff who then made a check pay-
able to the bank with instructions to establish credit in a distant
bank for a third party. These cases as well as subsequent Mis-
souri cases are silent as regards the custom of banks to credit the
indorser and to mix the collected funds with the general assets
as advanced by the majority view.2 0 Both apply the rule that
"an agent is bound to keep the property of the principal separate
from his own; if he mixes it with his own, the whole may be
taken both in law and equity to be the property of the principal
until the agent puts the subject matter under such circumstances
as that it may be distinguished." 21
The factual situation in the case of First National Bank of
Lapeer v. Sanford2 is typical of that in Federal Reserve Bank v.
Millspaugh. Items were sent for collection through a clearing
house. At the time of collection and charge of the account an
' Harrison v. Smith (1884), 83 Mo. 210; Stoller v. Coates (1885), 88 Mo.
514; Orr v. St. Louis Union Trust Co. (1922), 219 Mo. 383, 404, 236 S. W.
642; Tufts v. Tatshaw (1903), 172 Mo. 359, 373, 72 S. W. 679; Bircher v.
Walther (1901), 163 Mo. 461, 63 S. W. 691.
(1884), 83 Mo. 210.
(1885), 88 Mo. 514.
"See note 1, supra.
'First Nat'l Bank of Lapeer v. Sanford (1895), 62 Mo. A. 394; Mid-
land Nat'l Bank v. Brightwell (1899), 148 Mo. 358, 49 S. W. 994; American
Bank v. People's Bank (Mo., 1923), 255 S. W. 943; Bank of Poplar Bluff
v. Millspaugh (1926), 313 Mo. 421, 281 S. W. 733; Federal Reserve Bank v.
Millspaugh (1926), 314 Mo. 1, 282 S. W. 706; State Farmers Mut. Tornado
Ins. Co. v. Cantley (Mo., 1928), 6 S. W. (2d) 970; Bank of Portland v. Mc-
Credie Bank (Mo., 1928), 300 S. W. 1018.
"Harrison v. Smith (1884), 83 Mo. 210; see cases note 16, supra.
(1895), 62 Mo. A. 394.
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amount of money sufficient for remittance was present in the
vaults of the bank, but at the time of assignment in insolvency
this condition ceased to exist. A preference was allowed. The
case was the first in Missouri to allow a preference on facts
similar to those in Federal Reserve Bank v. Millspaugh. The
court was guided in its opinion, which was afterwards refined by
a requirement that funds in amount sufficient to cover the items
sent be present in the vault of the defunct bank or to its credit
in solvent correspondent banks at the time of failure,23 by the
Harrison case, which was cited as presenting a case precisely in
point. This is true if we assume that sending paper for collec-
tion and remittance creates the same relationship to the pro-
ceeds as does sending a check upon a second bank to be applied
in a manner prescribed by a course of correspondence between
the parties. If we make this assumption, the decision rests
solidly upon the Harrison and Stoller cases. Since the Missouri
courts have never considered the view taken by the majority
ruling, but have concerned themselves with contending that
funds wrongfully mixed may be traced,24 and that if the general
assets of the bank have been increased by such wrongful conver-
sion, a preference will be permitted, 5 they have apparently con-
cluded that nothing need be said about an intention so clearly
evidenced as that by paper sent for "collection and remittance."
Midland National Bank v. Brightwel 26 refused a preference
because at the time the collection was made by charging the
drawee's account, the total funds of the bank amounted to far
less than the amount of items so collected. The court reasoned
that since there was nothing upon which the charge could oper-
ate, there could be no swelling of the assets of the bank, and the
mere transfering of a naked liability, in the absence of a res,
from one person to another does not swell the assets of the bank.
The doctrine rests upon the fact that no inference could be
drawn that the assets in the hands of the receiver were the pro-
duct of collections for the plaintiff. From this and other Mis-
souri cases 27 it is plain that, while courts do not require a phy-
sical res to the extent of an actual cash increment, they do re-
quire it to be present in the funds of the bank both at the time
of the charge and at the date of actual bankruptcy.
"Bank of Poplar Bluff v. Millspaugh (1926), 313 Mo. 412, 281 S. W. 733;
Federal Reserve Bank v. Quigley (Mo., 1926), 284 S. W. 164.
"See cases note 16, supra.
"First Nat'l Bank of Lapeer v. Sanford (1895), 62 Mo. A. 394; Fed-
eral Reserve Bank v. Millspaugh (1926), 314 Mo. 1, 282 S. W. 706.(1899), 148 Mo. 358, 49 S. W. 994.
American Bank of DeSoto v. People's Bank of DeSoto (Mo., 1923), 255
S. W. 943.
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Some doubt was created as to the extent of the Missouri doc-
trine by the case of American Bank of De Soto v. People's Bank
of De Soto.28 Each bank honored checks made upon the other.
A balance was struck and the checks returned to the respective
banks to be charged against the makers' accounts. The court
was of the opinion that there was never a relation of principal
and agent, and that the checks were presented for payment and
not for collection. The relation between a bank and depositor
is that of debtor and creditor, and an order by the creditor to
pay a third person does not constitute the latter a cestui que
trust. The case was distinguished by that of Federal Reserve
Bank v. Millspaugh as containing a reciprocal accounts arrange-
ment, and thereby exposing a clear intention by the parties to
become debtor or creditor as the balance might indicate.2 While
the reciprocal accounts feature is present in the American Bank
case, the opinion indicated that its absence would not have al-
tered the decision, and it is to that extent overruled by the case
of Bank v. Poplar Bluff v. Millspaugh30 and Federal Reserve
Bank v. Millspaugh.' That "sufficient funds" as required by
the Missouri court means funds in the vault of the insolvent
bank or insolvent correspondent bank was established by the
case of Federal Reserve Bank v. Quigley32 by applying the dictum
in the case of Bank of Poplar Bluff v. Millspaugh.33
The Missouri doctrine thus appears to be that in the absence
of intention to the contrary, as designated by a reciprocal ac-
counts arrangement, to send paper for "collection and remit-
tance" creates the relationship of principal and agent which is
not changed by any act of the agent in contravention of his au-
- (Mo., 1923), 255 S. W. 943.
'Federal Reserve Bank v. Millspaugh (1926), 314 Mo. 1, 282 S. W. 706.
"Upon a certification of the Poplar Bluff case to this court the opinion of
the Court of Appeals was, in a well considered opinion by Bradley in all
things affirmed, and it was held that the opinion of the Court of Appeals in
the ruling in the Poplar Bluff case did not conflict with that in the Ameri-
can Bank case (supra), in that in the latter, it was shown that a reciprocal
relation existed between the banks and not one of principal and agent. The
same questions being involved in the Poplar Bluff case as in the instant
case, it is not necessary to the determination of the case at bar to do more
than state with approval the ruling principles announced in that case."
(1926), 313 Mo. 412, 281 S. W. 733.
It was there held that sending a check for collection is in fact consti-
tuting the bank an agent for collection from itself, and is not a presentation
for payment.
' (Mo., 1926), 284 S. W. 164.
' "When the Slater Savings Bank drew its draft, and indorsed the one
drawn by the Citizens Stock Bank, it did not have sufficient money in its
vaults or elsewhere to pay its own draft on the one it indorsed."
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thority by the method of collection, credit, attempted remittance
or by mixing the proceeds with the general assets, provided
funds sufficient to constitute a res exist in the insolvent bank
or solvent correspondent banks at the time of charge and of in-
solvency. While the above doctrine may be a minority holding,
the view is finding favor with courts of other states, and from
the number of recent decisions holding in accord, it may in time
be adopted by the majority of the courts.3 4 This doctrine,
whether its application of trust principles is justified or not,
reaches a decision in accord with the intention of the parties and
the practice of the business world in substituting negotiable
paper and systems of accounts for actual currency transfers.
Collection of a single draft aside from that by the Federal
Reserve system may involve numerous banks and may take a
circuitous route in reaching the bank upon which it is drawn.
The courts refusing a preference are in effect indicating that the
owner of the paper intended to become a creditor of each bank
through whom collection is to be made. The contest, after all,
is between a distant owner of the paper and the depositors of
the collecting bank. The latter presumably have made inves-
tigation and satisfied themselves as to the soundness of the bank.
Certainly the opportunity for such has been present, as has that
of constant surveillance. The former is in no position to do so
and cannot reasonably be presumed to have done so. The two
do not occupy the same position and to compel them to share
pari passu is to take an inequitable view.
FRANK E. MATHEWS, '30.
Hanover Nat'l Bank of N. Y. v. Thomas (Ala., 1928), 117 So. 42; Gen-
try County Drainage Dist. v. Farmer & Mechanics Bank (Mo., 1928), 5
S. W. (2d) 1110; KesI v. Hanover State Bank (1921), 109 Kan. 776, 204 P.
994; Hawaiian Pineapple Co. v. Brown (1923), 69 Mont. 140, 220 P. 1114;
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond v. Bohannan (1925), 141 Va. 285; Fed-
eral Reserve Bank v. Peters (1924), 139 Va. 45, 123 S. E. 379; Goodyear
Tire and Rubber Co. v. Hanover State Bank (1921), 109 Kan. 772, 204 P.
992; Murray v. North Liberty Savings Bank (1923), 196 Ia. 729, 195 N. W.
354; First Nat'l Bank v. Demin (1915), 20 N. M. 96, 146 P. 948; People's
Bank v. Iuka State Bank (1923), 229 Ill. A. 4; State Bank v. First Nat'1
Bank (1916), 124 Ark. 531, 187 S. W. 673; Rainwater Bank of Com. v. Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of St. Louis (Ark., 1927), 290 S. W. 69; State Farmers
Mut. Tornado Ins. Co. v. Cantley (Mo., 1928), 6 S. W. (2d) 970; Bank of
Portland v. McCredie Bank (Mo., 1928), 300 S. W. 1018.
" Moulton, PRINCIPLES OF MONEY AND BANKING (1916), p. 324, sec. 161;
Wright, READINGS IN MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING PRINCIPLES, p. 383.
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